Bribery, hold-up, and bureaucratic structure by Bennett, J. & Rablen, M.D.
This is a repository copy of Bribery, hold-up, and bureaucratic structure.




Bennett, J. and Rablen, M.D. orcid.org/0000-0002-3521-096X (2021) Bribery, hold-up, and





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) licence. This licence 
allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even commercially, as long as you credit the 
authors for the original work. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
OR I G I N A L AR T I C L E
Bribery, hold-up, and bureaucratic structure
John Bennett, Visiting Professor1 | Matthew D. Rablen, Reader in Economics2
1Department of Economics, Royal
Holloway University of London,
Egham, UK
2Department of Economics, University of
Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Correspondence
Department of Economics, University of




We consider infrastructure provision by a foreign investor when the domestic
bureaucracy is corrupt, but also cares for domestic welfare. Bureaucrats bar-
gain with the investor over price and (potentially) bribes, both before the
investment is sunk and afterwards, using the threat of expropriation. We show
that domestic welfare may be greater in equilibria with bribery than in equilib-
ria without. We specify conditions under which changes in the degree of
bureaucratic centralization or of bureaucratic care have a positive, negative, or
nonmonotonic effect on domestic welfare. The impact of centralization on
domestic welfare is mediated through the level of bureaucratic care.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Bribery of public officials by private agents has been estimated to amount to about $1 trillion per annum across the
world (World Bank, 2016). It may take the form of “grand corruption,” with small numbers of firms or their representa-
tives paying large amounts of money, or of “petty corruption,” for example with many people paying small bribes to
avoid fines for traffic offenses. In this paper we focus on grand corruption, examining how bribery may be related to
contract terms in a context that has been of considerable significance to developing economies in the last 30 years or
so—investment in infrastructure and public service provision by a foreign firm.1
For such projects, corruption may occur both before and after an investment has been sunk. As noted by Transparency
International (2017), large investments in infrastructure provide significant opportunities for bribery in the awarding of
the lucrative contracts involved. Moreover, in many developing economies the rule of law is insufficient to prevent gov-
ernments from reneging on contracts. Because investments in infrastructure can involve a sunk element that is long-lived
and specific, investors are particularly vulnerable to hold-up, leading to renegotiation (Laffont, 2005). Kenny and
Søreide (2008), for instance, find that although the efficiency effects of private provision have been positive, because of
high fixed costs there are few potential providers, and the fiscal costs associated with bribery have been high.2
There is a large body of evidence that, at the national level, bribery has a pernicious effect on welfare
(Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). In cross-country analyses bribery is typically found to correlate negatively with per
capita national income and growth, and with the quality of government.3 Nonetheless, some studies, such as by Méon
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and Weill (2010) and Dreher and Gassebner (2013), find that in highly regulated economies and where institutions are
ineffective, bribery may have a positive association with measures of efficiency, and it is argued that such results are
consistent with the “grease hypothesis,” whereby bribery may facilitate some transactions in a socially beneficial way.4
However, such aggregate studies may be consistent with other routes through which bribery can in some circumstances
have a beneficial effect. We identify one such route in this paper (although we also specify various conditions under
which bribery has an adverse effect on welfare).
Despite its pervasiveness, the existence of bribery does not necessarily imply that the individuals concerned care
only about their own incomes or utilities, narrowly defined. In his classic contribution, Klitgaard (1988) shows, using
five case studies from developing economies, that corruption can be limited by raising its “moral costs.” More recently,
using data from a large international panel, Dong et al. (2012) find that the willingness to undertake corrupt activities
is limited by social norms.
Evidence provided by Svensson (2003) suggests that when bribery occurs, its level is determined by bargaining.
He finds that firms' ability to pay, proxied by their current and expected future profitability, and “refusal power,”
measured by the estimated alternative return on capital, can explain a large part of the variation in bribes across
firms. Furthermore, the role that hold-up can play in determining bribe levels is established empirically by Olken
and Barron (2009), who study the payments by truck drivers to various officials on trips in Indonesia. Consistent
with hold-up theory, they find that drivers who have more to lose, and those who have to pass through more
check-points, pay more in bribes.
Although there have been numerous empirical studies of the impact of decentralization on corruption, many employing
cross-national regressions, the evidence is mixed. Thus, a survey of 260 studies from across the social sciences by Gans-
Morse et al. (2018) concludes that a consensus has not been reached. This suggests that, irrespective of the effect that corrup-
tion may have on welfare, the effect of decentralization on welfare, as mediated through the transmission mechanism of cor-
ruption, will not be clear-cut. And indeed, the empirical literature that considers more generally whether decentralization is
beneficial or costly for government performance and welfare is inconclusive (see Goel et al., 2017).
In this paper we attempt to capture the characteristics of infrastructure provision in developing economies discussed
above and, in this context, to throw some light on the interrelationships between (de)centralization, the values of bureau-
crats, the incidence of bribery, and the level of welfare. We analyze potential bribery in a framework in which bureaucrats
bargain sequentially with an investor on behalf of the government both over the initial contract and through hold-up after
an investment is made.5 We assume that the investor has already been chosen by the government, any preliminary feasi-
bility studies having already been undertaken, and that the size of the investment has been fixed. Thus it would be costly
for the government to begin the process again with another firm, even if one were available.
In our model, bureaucrat B1 agrees a contract with the investor, specifying the price the investor will be paid and
may, as part of the deal, also negotiate a bribe payment in return for a higher price.6 Then, after the investment has
been sunk, bureaucrat B2 may hold up the investor, using the threat of “direct” expropriation (whereby the state would
seize the assets and operate them itself).7 To avert direct expropriation, B2 may either demand a bribe, or may require
the investor to pay a tax. The latter is commonly referred to as ‘indirect’ expropriation—see UNCTAD (2012).8 In the
equilibria we analyze, investment takes place and direct expropriation, although a credible threat, is averted.
As in the seminal analysis of bureaucratic corruption by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), we allow for the extreme cases
of pure centralization, where the two bureaucrats collude fully to maximize their joint payoff, and pure decentraliza-
tion, where each bureaucrat independently maximizes his or her own payoff; but we take a more general approach, also
covering intermediate cases in which there is imperfect collusion between bureaucrats. Bureaucrats may coordinate
their behavior because they are engaged in a long-term relationship, but, as argued by Mookherjee (2013), the enforce-
ability of side contracts between colluding agents may be limited. We develop a simple linear model, excluding any con-
siderations of asymmetric information, to focus on the relationship between the bureaucrats' “corruptibility” and the
potential hold-up of the investor. The bureaucrats' corruptibility depends on the extent of centralization and the
concern they may have for domestic welfare.
Solving by backward induction, we first consider the second period, with the investment already having been sunk.
If the price agreed by the investor with B1 exceeds a critical level, B2 will hold up the investor using the threat of direct
expropriation. If corruptibility is positive, B2 will negotiate a bribe with the investor, leaving the price paid to the gov-
ernment unchanged. But if corruptibility is nonpositive B2 will negotiate a tax to be paid into public coffers, the investor
thus receiving a lower price net of tax. In the first period, anticipating what will happen in the second, B1 and the inves-
tor negotiate the contract price for the project, with an associated bribe possibly being paid to B1. For realism, we
assume that there is a nonnegativity constraint on any bribe.
2 BENNETT AND RABLEN
The main part of our exposition assumes, for simplicity, that if expropriation were to occur the government would
be only marginally inefficient in running the project. The price agreed by B1 and the investor is always then high
enough for hold-up to occur in the second period.9 If the nonnegativity constraint does not bind, the equilibrium first-
period bribe splits the bargaining surplus equally between B1 and the investor. If the constraint binds, then the bribe is
set at zero, and the bureaucrat receives more than half the surplus.
We first solve the model for price, bribe and tax levels and their relationship with corruptibility. We then focus on
the roles of bureaucratic care and centralization and the impacts on domestic welfare.
We find that, depending on parameter values, there are three different types of equilibrium. The full-bribery solu-
tion holds if corruptibility is at least as high as a critical level. Then both bureaucrats secure bribes and price is set at its
maximal level (equal to the domestic benefit from the project). The partial-bribery solution holds if corruptibility is
below the critical level but still positive. Then B2 secures a bribe, but B1 does not, and price is set below the maximal
level. The no-bribery solution obtains if corruptibility is nonpositive, in which case B2 imposes a tax. While the net-of-
tax price in this case is less than the maximal level, it may nevertheless be greater or less than price in the partial-
bribery case. Implicit collusion between B1 and the investor plays an important role here. When B2 secures a bribe this
constitutes a leakage in the bargaining surplus available to B1 and the investor, and this leakage is greater when price is
higher. So, in equilibria with a bribe for B2, one of the forces at work is that B1 and the investor would rather hold back
price to some extent to limit the leakage.
We then focus on the roles of bureaucratic care and centralization in these equilibria. We consider first how varia-
tion of the degree of bureaucratic care may cause a transition between the three types of equilibrium, and how this may
affect domestic welfare. As might be expected, we find that a decrease in the degree of care that causes a transition from
a partial-bribe equilibrium to a full-bribe equilibrium has a negative effect on domestic welfare. If, however, the
decrease in care causes a transition from a no-bribe to a partial-bribe equilibrium, the effect on domestic welfare may
be of either sign. Thus, we specify conditions under which a reduction in bureaucratic care causes bribery to occur, with
this having a positive effect on domestic welfare.
Moreover, the above-mentioned transitions between equilibria may also occur as a result of an increase in the
degree of centralization. Consequently, in the partial-bribe to full-bribe transition less centralization has a negative
effect on domestic welfare. In the no-bribe to partial-bribe transition, however, less centralization may have an effect
on domestic welfare of either sign. This is consistent with the mixed results for the centralization-welfare relationship
found in both the empirical literature, as noted above, and in the theoretical literature (which we discuss in Section 2).
An implication of these results is that transitions across the three types of equilibrium caused by variation in the
degree of centralization or of bureaucratic care may have a nonmonotonic effect on domestic welfare. We depict a com-
plex interaction between these parameters, as well as with the terms on which direct expropriation would occur. At a
low enough or high enough level of bureaucratic care for domestic welfare, variation of the degree of centralization has
no effect on domestic welfare. However, for an intermediate level of care, the sign of this effect depends on the precise
level of care; that is, the welfare impact of having a greater degree of bureaucratic centralization depends on the values
of the bureaucrats involved.
In Section 2 we give a short review of related literature, and in Section 3 we formulate our model. In Section 4 we
consider the renegotiation (hold-up) stage. In Section 5 we examine the negotiation stage, at which the contract price is
agreed. Section 6 brings the results together and characterizes the equilibrium of the model. Section 7 provides some
further discussion, and Section 8 concludes. Appendix gives proofs omitted from the text.
2 | RELATED LITERATURE
In this section we discuss theoretical literature that is broadly related to the themes of this paper.10 We note first the dif-
ference between our formulation and the hypothesis put forward by Leff (1964) that corruption may increase domestic
welfare by “greasing the wheels” of transactions, enabling entrepreneurs to circumvent bureaucratic obstacles that
impede efficiency. A bribe may, for example, be paid by an entrepreneur to obtain a license more quickly (Lui, 1985) or
bribe offers by entrepreneurs for a license may in effect constitute a competitive auction, with the highest offer coming
from the most efficient entrepreneur (Lien, 1986).
In our model, however, there is only one firm and its costs are given. Grease exists, but only in the background, in
the sense that a bribe may avert direct expropriation, which would have been followed by inefficient government provi-
sion. We consider only equilibria in which direct expropriation does not occur, and the difference in domestic welfare
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between solutions with and without bribery stems purely from the difference in the net-of-tax payments the govern-
ment makes to the investor, rather than from a difference in the efficiency of resource use. The source of the possible
beneficial effect of bribery is how the payment by the government is affected by collusion between one bureaucrat and
the investor against the interests of the other bureaucrat.
Whereas in our formulation bribes are determined sequentially, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) assume that bureaucrats
make simultaneous decisions about granting licenses to firms for operation in an industry. The internalization of bribe
externalities by bureaucrats that occurs with centralized corruption is then found to be associated with a lower total
value of bribes, and higher output and welfare than obtains with decentralized corruption. However, in the literature
that elaborates on this framework, it is found, as we find in our model, that centralization may not yield a clear-cut
advantage. We consider here three prominent examples of this literature.
First, Waller et al. (2002) examine the potential role for an administrator, who would specify how much each
bureaucrat should take in bribes. The administrator would keep a proportion of the proceeds and would monitor each
bureaucrat imperfectly, penalizing any discovered deviation of a bribe from the mandated level. This form of centraliza-
tion allows some internalizing of bribe externalities, but adds another bribe-taking player into the model, and so does
not necessarily have a positive effect on welfare.
Second, Choi and Thum (2003) formulate a two-period variation of the Shleifer–Vishny model where in each period
a single bureaucrat can grant licenses for firms to enter an industry, and may demand bribes. Firms differ in their prof-
itability, which at least initially is their private knowledge. Choi and Thum compare the effects of having the same or
different bureaucrats in post in the two periods, which may be regarded as a parallel to centralization and decentraliza-
tion in our model. As we find, the relative impacts of the two structures on bribe levels and welfare are not clear-cut.
Third, Echazu and Bose (2008) incorporate an informal production sector into the Shleifer–Vishny framework. Any
firm may operate formally or informally, but with lower productivity in the latter case. The authors find that if all bribe
activity (across both sectors) is centralized, the effects on bribes and total welfare may go in either direction. This is
because formal sector bribery causes endogenous switching of firms to the informal sector, where productivity is lower
(and monitoring costs exist). Thus, it is again found that adding complications to the Shleifer–Vishny framework results
in conclusions about (de)centralization that are conditional.
Another aspect of decentralization, albeit one outside the scope of our analysis, is the potential benefit from devolv-
ing responsibility for public service delivery to local elected officials. This is explored by Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2006), who assume that central government officials are less informed than local officials about local
needs and are less able to monitor effectively. This benefit of decentralization of decision-making must be set against
the disadvantage that local officials may be susceptible to capture by local elites. In addition, as shown by Albornoz and
Cabrales (2013), a sufficiently high level of political competition may result in less corruption.
Expropriation and hold-up are modeled in a multi-period framework by Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Dechenaux
and Samuel (2012). In each of these models the sunk investment is chosen endogenously, whereas in our model we
assume a given level of sunk cost in order to focus on the interaction of (de)centralization and bureaucratic care for
domestic welfare. Thomas and Worrall assume that the fear of expropriation may cause foreign investors to adopt tech-
nologies with inefficiently low sunk costs. The government balances the short-run benefits from expropriating against
the impact on the country's reputation with potential future foreign investors. Dechenaux and Samuel (2012) develop
an intertemporal model of bribery and hold-up in which a regulator hires an inspector to monitor regulatory compli-
ance by a firm. The inspector may exert effort, which raises the probability of revealing whether the “right” technology
has been chosen. There is also a higher-level principal who (probabilistically) penalizes both the firm and the inspector
if it discovers that a bribe has been taken. Nonetheless, repeated interaction between the inspector and the firm can
support a bribe equilibrium in trigger strategies.
Our model also relates to the literature on sequential common agency, which analyzes dynamic games in which
multiple principals contract sequentially with the same agent (see Pavan & Calzonari, 2009, for an overview). This liter-
ature focuses on mechanism design, incorporating private information and private contracting. However, an early con-
tribution by Martimort (1996) is closer to our framework. He develops a model with two government principals who
may behave nonbenevolently. These principals must accept or reject projects proposed by private investors who have
private information on their own costs. He shows that having independent principals is more distortionary than if the
principals act as a unit.11 This distortion is greater if the principals deal sequentially, rather than simultaneously, with
any given investor. But he notes that his results require asymmetric information in order to hold. Without it, integration
and separation of principals (corresponding to centralization and decentralization in our model) are equivalent. How-
ever, as the corruption literature initiated by Shleifer and Vishny indicates, this result may not hold in other
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institutional frameworks. Indeed, our analysis shows that welfare may even be nonmonotone in the degree of separa-
tion of government officials.
Our assumption that bureaucrats are concerned about domestic welfare, as well as bribes, accords with the analysis by
Balafoutas (2011), who models corruption as a repeated psychological game where bureaucrats suffer from guilt aversion
and are less likely to take bribes if this is thought to let the public down. A related approach is taken by Ahlin and
Bose (2007), who consider a partially corrupt bureaucracy. There are some bureaucrats who would always reject the offer
of a bribe and others who would have no compunction about accepting one; applicants for licenses do not know which
type they will encounter. Also, Hajzler and Rosborough (2016) formulate a dynamic model where the type of bureaucrat is
uncertain and corrupt types encourage investment in return for bribes using the threat of direct expropriation.
Whereas we examine renegotiation as the result of hold-up, Guasch et al. (2006, 2008) consider renegotiation of con-
cession contracts resulting from informational shocks that occur after the initial contract is agreed. The government
and the investor fix initial contract terms by reference to expected payoffs, but when the value of a stochastic variable is
revealed, one of the players then may wish to renegotiate. The 2006 paper examines the case in which the investor may
wish to renegotiate, for example because the investor's profits are unexpectedly low; the 2008 paper analyzes
government-led renegotiation resulting from unexpectedly high profits.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the contribution of Bliss and Di Tella (1997) which, despite its different con-
text, like our model yields what may be seen as a counter-intuitive conclusion as a result of endogenous adjust-
ment of critical variables in the face of parameter changes. They model a competitive industry in which firms
may differ in their overhead costs and each firm is dealt with by a corrupt official who has the power to close it
down. What they call greater “deep competition” (lower overhead costs or more similar cost structures) can
result in higher total bribes and lower welfare. This occurs through the endogenous adjustment of the number of
firms and bribe behavior by officials.
3 | THE MODEL
Consider an infrastructure project that requires a fixed investment to be sunk by a given foreign firm (‘the investor’),
and for which payment will be made out of public sector funds. This is consistent with the output of the project having
a large public good element (e.g., a port or a road) or being a merit good for which a policy decision has been taken that
distribution will be free or at a nominal price (e.g., water).
The timeline for the bargaining game is shown in Figure 1. At time t = 1 the investor and bureaucrat B1 agree a
price P1 for the project. Failure to agree would yield default payoffs which we normalize to zero. The agreement may
involve the payment by the investor of bribe b1 > 0 to B1. At time t=1
1
2
, the investor sinks an investment K, leaving it
vulnerable to hold-up. At t = 2, bureaucrat B2 will trigger renegotiation if the threat of direct expropriation is credible,
demanding a payment by the investor. Depending on parameter values, this payment may take the form of a tax T paid
to the government (indirect expropriation) or a bribe b2 to bureaucrat B2. The final (net) price paid by the government
is therefore P = P1−T.
The contract is seen to be incomplete, with the bureaucracy having de facto residual control rights over the asset.
We assume that each player has perfect foresight. If direct expropriation were to occur, the government would operate
the project; but we focus on cases in which, in equilibrium, the investor undertakes the investment, correctly anticipat-
ing any renegotiation, and then operates the project.
Let W denote the running costs of the project for the investor and Π its profit (for simplicity, we exclude dis-
counting). If the investor sinks capital K and operates the project,
Π= P1−K−W−T−b1−b2: ð1Þ
The investor would only undertake the project if Π > 0, a necessary condition for which is P > K + W. Accordingly, we
assume that
t = 11





FIGURE 1 The bargaining game
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1 > K +W : ð2Þ
We normalize the utility of the project output to the domestic population to be 1, and we assume that the budget avail-
able to finance the project imposes the constraint P ≤ 1 on the net price (hence, P1 ≤ 1 + T). The net impact of the
project on domestic welfare is12
D=1−P: ð3Þ
For all P < 1, D > 0.
We assume that each bureaucrat Bi places a unit value on bribe income, and places a value η  [0, 1] on each unit
of domestic welfare D, achieving utility
vi = bi + ηD, i 1,2f g: ð4Þ
The behavior of each bureaucrat depends on the extent to which the bureaucrats collude. At one extreme, there
may be pure centralization, so that they coordinate their behavior perfectly to maximize the sum of their utilities. At
the other extreme, there may be pure decentralization, with the two bureaucrats pursuing their own objectives indepen-
dently (perhaps belonging to different government agencies). We characterize the extent of enforceable collusion
between the bureaucrats by the value θ  [0, 1] a bureaucrat places on the utility of the other bureaucrat, as given by
(4). Thus, Bi maximizes the utility function
ui = vi + θvj i 1,2f g; j≠i: ð5Þ
If θ = 1, (5) reduces to pure centralization, with each bureaucrat Bi weighting v1 and v2 equally; if θ = 0 we have pure
decentralization, with each bureaucrat Bi maximizing vi (i = 1, 2). While θ is a measure of the degree of centralization,
for brevity we shall refer it as the “centralization” parameter. Substituting from (3) and (4), ui writes in full as
ui = bi + θbj + η 1+ θð Þ 1−P1 +Tð Þ: ð6Þ
If the total concern η(1 + θ) for a unit of domestic welfare were sufficiently great a bureaucrat would be willing to use
his or her own funds to pay a bribe to the investor to undertake the project. However, as it seems unlikely that individ-
ual bureaucrats could offer bribes from their personal funds on a scale sufficient to influence materially major infra-
structure projects, we impose the restriction that bribes can only be positive.
From (6), and taking into account the different roles that the two bureaucrats play, we define
κ=1−η 1+ θð Þ
to be an index of “corruptibility,” which applies for each bureaucrat. This is derived by considering the cost–benefit
decision facing bureaucrat B2 at t = 2 if hold-up is a credible threat, in which case B2 will choose whether to pro-
cure a bribe b2 or to levy a tax T. From (6), each $1 of bribe yields B2 a unit benefit, while each $1 of tax yields a
unit of domestic welfare, with a value to B2 of η(1 + θ). If κ > (<)0, u2 is greater (smaller) when B2 secures $1 of
bribe income rather than levying $1 of tax. The size of κ is also relevant for bureaucrat B1 (although we shall see
that whether B1 secures a bribe does not depend on the sign of κ). B1 agrees with the investor the price P1 and pos-
sibly a bribe b1. If κ > (<)0, B1 would gain more (less) from $1 of bribe income than s/he would lose from having
price $1 lower.13
We assume that if direct expropriation were to occur the project would still yield 1 of benefit, but that the state
would be less efficient than the investor at operating the facility, with running costs (1 + γ)W, where γ  (0, K/W). (The
rationale for the upper bound on γ will be explained below.) The cost to the government of direct expropriation would
be C(P1) + (1 + γ)W, where C(P1) > 0 denotes the compensation paid to the investor. We assume that C(P1) is indepen-
dent of {η, θ}. In practice, international investment is protected by customary international law and by numerous Inter-
national Investment Agreements. Most agreements follow the Hull standard, typically specifying compensation
according to “fair market value” for the asset, but there is no agreed precise definition (UNCTAD, 2012). We make the
following assumptions:
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1. C
0
(P1) = α  (0, 1) for all P1  (K + W, 1 + T);
2. C(K + W) < K − γW;






The first assumption is that compensation responds positively to the agreed price, but by less than one-for-one.14 It
implies that compensation is of the form {αP1 + constant}. This is consistent with the investor being partially compen-
sated for the forgone profit P1 − W from running the project. A larger α denotes a greater sensitivity of compensation to
forgone profit; if α is small this might reflect the role of a lump-sum penalty or a compensation payment more closely
related to the sunk investment. The other two assumptions are boundary conditions that are explained below our first
lemma.
At t = 2, both the investment K and any bribe b1 are bygones. In making a decision over whether to hold up the
investor, bureaucrat B2 takes into account that, if the contract is honored, D = 1 − P1, while if there were direct expro-
priation, D = 1 − [C(P1) + (1 + γ)W]. The threat of direct expropriation is therefore credible if P1 > C(P1) + (1 + γ)W.
We then have the following result.
Lemma 1. Given Assumptions 2 and 3, there exists a unique price PH  (K + W, (1 + K + W)/2) satisfying
PH =C PH
 
+ 1+ γð ÞW ð7Þ
such that hold-up will occur when P1 > P
H, but not when P1 ≤ P
H.
Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that PH is in the specified range, allowing us to exclude some potential degenerate and
multiple solutions.15 Given Assumption 2, it is necessary that γ < K/W, as specified earlier, for C(P1) to be positive for
all P1  [K + W, 1]. When P1 > P
H, since γ > 0, (7) implies that P1 − W > C(P1). Thus, when direct expropriation is a
credible threat, the profitability of the project if the contract is honored, P1 − W, exceeds the compensation, C(P1), that
would be paid if direct expropriation were to occur. In other words, when direct expropriation is a credible threat the
investor prefers that it should not occur.
We proceed by backward induction. First, for given price P1, we determine either the tax T or bribe b2, if any, that
will be agreed by B2 and the investor at t = 2. Then we determine the price P1 and any bribe b1 that will be agreed by B1
and the investor at t = 1, assuming that they anticipate correctly how T or b2, as appropriate, will depend on P1.
We assume that in their agreement at each stage, t = 1, 2, the investor and the relevant bureaucrat exhaust any pos-
sible mutually beneficial gains, and that on the set of feasible outcomes that—for these two players—are Pareto effi-
cient, their behavior is determined by a Nash bargain.
4 | POTENTIAL HOLD-UP (t = 2)
Solving by backward induction, we first take price P1 as given and focus on time t = 2. If P1 > P
H hold-up takes place,
in which case B2 demands a payment, either in the form of a tax or in the form of a bribe. If P1 ≤ P
H there is no hold-up
at t = 2 and so T = b2 = 0. In the hold-up case, given the linearity of u2, if bureaucrat B2 eschews bribery, that is, if
b2 = 0, s/he will wish to negotiate as high a tax T as possible. Similarly, if, B2 is willing to take at least $1 of bribe then,
s/he will instead wish to negotiate as high a bribe b2 as possible. As we saw in Section 2, if corruptibility κ > 0, B2 pre-
fers to take a bribe, and so T = 0; but, if κ ≤ 0, B2 prefers to negotiate a tax T > 0.
Given the price P1 agreed at t = 1, we assume that a Nash bargain takes place between bureaucrat B2 and the inves-
tor.16 This gives the following solution for t = 2.
Lemma 2. Assume hold-up is feasible, that is, P1 > P
H. Then
i. If κ ≤ 0, b2 = 0 and





W T* P1ð Þ > 0:
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 b*2 P1ð Þ > 0:
Thus, the charge to the investor—whether as a bribe or a tax—is increasing in the price P1 agreed at t = 1, but at a
rate of less than one-for-one:






1−αð Þ 2−κð Þ 0,1ð Þ:
ð8Þ
Intuitively, b*2 P1ð Þ is related negatively to corruptibility κ. This is because, for given P1, domestic welfare if the investor
runs the project is smaller than it would be if there were direct expropriation (this is what makes the threat credible). A
lower level of corruptibility κ inflates the negative impact on u2 of not expropriating. As a result, the size of the bribe
b2(P1) that the investor must pay in the Nash bargaining solution to prevent expropriation, is larger. If, for any P1, the
compensation parameter α is greater, then T or b2, as appropriate, is smaller. Since compensation C is greater, the utility
to B2 of direct expropriation is smaller. Consequently, the Nash-bargaining payment that the investor must pay with
hold-up is smaller.
5 | THE INITIAL AGREEMENT (t = 1)
In negotiations at t = 1 bureaucrat B1 and the investor will anticipate how potential hold-up at t = 2 will depend on
first-period price P1. It follows from Lemma 2 that, when P1 > P
H, so that hold-up will occur, we may write the net
price as
P=
P1−T* P1ð Þ if κ≤ 0, P1 > PH ;
P1 otherwise:
(
Subsuming T and P1 into P, we can write Π ≡ Π(b2) = P − K − W − b1 − b2 and u1 ≡ u1(b2) = b1 + θb2 + (1 − κ)(1 − P).
Henceforth, we therefore work directly in the net price P in our derivations. As limP1#PHT
* P1ð Þ= γW=2, the critical net










Behavior at t = 2 implies that the total surplus to be bargained over at t = 1 is given by
S1 Pð Þ=






if κ > 0, P P,1ð ;
Π 0ð Þ+ u1 0ð Þ otherwise:
(
ð9Þ
Using (1) and (6), it can be seen that S1(P) is independent of b1, for this variable acts in a purely redistributive man-
ner between B1 and the investor. This is in contrast to P, which affects the size of the surplus as well as how it is distrib-
uted. It is instructive to note how b2 and T affect the surplus. From (1), (6), and (9),















Equation (10) clarifies that when B2 obtains a higher bribe from the investor, this yields (weakly) a collective
loss to B1 and the investor. As the bribe does not affect domestic welfare, the only impact on u1 is the value
θ ≤ 1 that B1 puts on each unit of bribe paid to B2. Thus B1's additional utility is (weakly) outweighed by the
investor's unit loss of profit. By contrast, when B2 levies a tax, this yields (weakly) a collective gain to B1 and the
investor.
This finding has important consequences for the model. Noting from Lemma 2 that limP#Pb
*
2 Pð Þ= limP#PT* Pð Þ=
γW=2 > 0, there is a discrete jump in the surplus when P is raised above P so that hold-up will occur. When κ>0 there
is a jump upward in b2 (from 0). This, in turn, causes a discrete fall in the surplus available to B1 and the investor.
When κ≤ 0 there is instead a jump upward in T. This, in turn, causes a discrete increase in the surplus available to B1
and the investor.
The discrete change in the surplus as P is raised above P is proportional to γW. Focusing on the case in which the
surplus falls (κ>0), if γW is sufficiently small then the loss in surplus is too small to deter B1 and the investor from
negotiating a price above PH, if they would otherwise wish to. This is necessarily the case in the limit if the government
is almost as efficient as the firm in running the project (γ # 0). If γW is sufficiently large, however, then B1 and the inves-
tor will negotiate a price at least as low as P=PH , so that hold-up will not occur. To permit the simplest exposition of
our main findings, we now focus on the case with γ # 0, before briefly considering the case of more inefficient govern-
ment provision (larger γ) in Section 7.
First, however, we narrow down the range of potential solutions for price P.
Lemma 3. The Nash product for B1 and the investor is maximized on P  [K + W, P
H] at P = PH and is increasing in P
for P # PH.
In the absence of hold-up, the Nash product is strictly concave and is maximized at P = (1 + K + W)/2. From Lemma 1
PH < (1 + K + W)/2, and so on P  [K + W, PH]P = PH is optimal. When P # PH, the Nash product is continuous through
PH and still increasing. Until Section 7, therefore, we may limit attention to P > PH, hold-up always occurring.
5.1 | Bribe negotiation
The bribe b1 plays a purely redistributional role for bureaucrat B1 and the investor, leaving the total surplus S1
unchanged. Taking into account how the solution at t = 2 depends on P, the Nash product in the bargain between these
two players is maximized if b1 is set such that the surplus S1(P) is split equally. We constrain b1 to be nonnegative, how-
ever, and so this solution may not be feasible. Consider the level of P at which, in the absence of a bribe b1, Π = u1.
Starting at b1 = 0, if P is below this critical level, Π > u1, in which case an increment to b1 would raise the Nash prod-
uct. However, for P above this critical level, Π < u1, a decrement to b1 would raise the Nash product. Thus, only at a suf-
ficiently high price P will B1 secure a positive bribe in the bargaining solution.







; κ≤ 0; ð12Þ






; κ > 0: ð13Þ
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Denote the bribe b1 that satisfies these conditions by b
*




2−κð Þ P−K−Wð Þ− 1−κð Þ 1−K−Wð Þ½  if κ≤ 0;
1
2
2−κð Þ P−K−Wð Þ− 1−κð Þ 1−K−Wð Þ− 1+ θð Þb*2 Pð Þ
 







Note that, for a given level of P, bribe b1 is lower when corruptibility κ > 0 than when κ ≤ 0. If κ > 0 the bribe b2 is paid,
and this constitutes a leakage to the third player, B2, from the surplus S1(P). Thus the investor is not willing to pay so
much to B1. In contrast, when κ ≤ 0 the tax T is paid, each unit of which has a utility η(1 + θ) to B1 and an impact −1
on the investor's profit. With κ = 1 − η(1 + θ) ≤ 0, S1(P) (weakly) increases by −κ. If instead the constraint on b1 binds,
the bargaining outcome satisfies b1 = 0 and Π/S1 < 1/2.
Let P̂ denote the price P above which B1 secures a positive bribe. As specified in the next lemma, such a price always
exists for κ>0, whereas for κ≤ 0 it exists if an additional condition, which we assume to hold, is fulfilled.
Lemma 4. If κ > 0, or if κ ≤ 0 and
1−K−W < 1−αð Þ 1+ θð Þ 1−PH
 
,
then there exists a P̂ K +W ,1ð Þ such that B1 will not take a bribe if P≤ P̂, but will take a bribe if P > P̂.






 1,1−κð Þ if κ≤ 0;
1
2
2−κð Þ− 1+ θð Þb*02 Pð Þ
n o







Accordingly, the first-period optimal bribe is increasing in price. When corruptibility is nonpositive, b*1 Pð Þ increases by
more than one-for-one in price.
5.2 | Price negotiation
We now consider the effects of a marginal increase in P on Π and u1, the respective payoffs of the investor and B1. For
the investor, these follow from (1), (8), and (15) and are given by
Π
0 Pð Þ=
1 > 0; if κ≤ 0, P≤ P̂;
1−b*1
0
Pð Þ<0 if κ≤ 0, P > P̂;
1−b*2
0














A higher level of P has a one-for-one effect on profit, but the endogenous variation of bribe levels must also be taken
into account. If P≤ P̂, so that b1 = 0, as in the first and third rows of (16), the investor always benefits from a price
increase, as this more than offsets the extra bribe (if any) to be paid to B2. If P > P̂, so that b1>0, the sign of the effect
on profit of a higher price depends on the sign of corruptibility κ. When κ≤ 0, so that b2 = 0, but b1>0, as in the second
row, the bribe b1 responds more than one-for-one with the price, so the investor actually prefers a lower price. When,
however, κ>0, as in the fourth row, with both bribes positive the effect could be of either sign depending on the
strength of the bribe responses to a price increase.
The corresponding incentives for B1 are more complicated than those for the investor. Using (6), along with (8) and
(15), we have
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u01 Pð Þ=
− 1−κð Þ<0 if κ≤ 0, P≤ P̂;
b*1
0
Pð Þ− 1−κð Þ<0 if κ≤ 0, P > P̂;
θb*2
0














As P affects domestic welfare negatively, an increase in P has a (weakly) negative impact on B1's utility, as shown by the term
−(1 − κ) in all rows. When corruptibility κ is nonpositive, as in the first two rows, so that B2 chooses to levy a tax, B1 will prefer
a lower price. In this case, any additional bribe would be insufficient to compensate B1 for the disutility felt from the loss of
domestic welfare. When corruptibility κ is positive, however, u01 Pð Þ may take either sign. As shown in the third row of (17),
if P≤ P̂, so that b1 = 0, the increase in B2's bribe yields B1 a utility of θ per unit. As shown in the fourth row, if P > P̂, so
that b1>0, B1 benefits directly from an increase in b1 as well as indirectly from the increase in b2. In these latter two
cases, therefore, given that B1 also experiences the disutility 1− κ for each unit of domestic welfare forgone, there exists
a critical level of corruptibility below which B1 prefers a lower price. This is specified in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. i. If κ > 0 and P≤ P̂—so that b1 is constrained to be zero, as in the third row of Equation (17)—then B1 pre-





 κ1 0,1ð :
ii. If κ > 0 and P > P̂—so that b1>0, as in the fourth row of Equations (16) and (17)—then both the investor and B1 pre-
fer a lower price P if and only if
κ<2 1−
2
2+ 1−θð Þ 1−αð Þ
 
 κ2 0,κ1ð Þ:
Since κ1 > κ2, if B1 prefers a lower price when b1 > 0, s/he will also prefer a lower price when b1 = 0. Note that part
(ii) of the lemma applies to both the investor and B1. The alignment of the interests of the investor and B1 is a general
feature of the model when b1 > 0, as there is then a clean division of duties between P and b1 in attaining a Nash
bargaining solution. Specifically, for each P, b1 can be chosen to distribute the surplus equally between the investor and
bureaucrat according to the first order conditions (12) and (13). Knowing each will receive half the surplus, both parties
then desire that P be chosen to maximize the surplus.
κ2 is the value of κ that makes the surplus S1 independent of P. More generally, as implied by the lemma,
κ⋛ κ2 , S01 Pð Þ⋛ 0: ð18Þ
Since S1 = Π + u1, (18) can be verified by adding the corresponding rows of (16) and (17). Note that κ2 is itself a func-
tion of θ: centralization θ has an independent role in determining the results, in addition to being a component of cor-
ruptibility κ.
To locate the bargaining outcome for price we consider each of the “local” bargaining solutions that apply in the dif-
ferent regions of the model. To do this, in Figure 2 we pull together the information in (16) and (17). The figure parti-
tions (κ, P)-space into a set in which u01 Pð Þ<0 and Π
0
(P) < 0 (denoted “−: −”); a set in which u01 Pð Þ<0 and Π
0
(P) > 0
(denoted “−: +”); and a set in which u01 Pð Þ > 0 and Π
0
(P) > 0 (denoted “+: +”).17
From (16) and Lemma 2, variation of P and of κ has opposite effects on b1. Starting at a point on either P̂-segment
in the figure, so that b1 = 0, suppose κ is increased marginally. Because this translates into a decrease in total care η(1
+ θ) for domestic welfare, it reduces u1. To restore equal payoffs for B1 and the investor, b1 would therefore have to
become positive. To return to the P̂-segment, a negative impact on b1 is required, which is achieved by lowering P.
Thus, each segment of P̂ is negatively sloped.
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The same argument applies if κ begins at a value just below 0 and changes to a value just above 0, but there is an
additional discrete effect. The bribe b2 > 0 then applies, which is a leakage from the surplus S1. This has a discrete nega-
tive impact on b1, and so to restore b1 to zero a discrete increase in P is necessary, resulting in the discontinuity in P̂ in
the figure.
For given κ, any P such that u01 Pð Þ<0 and Π
0
(P) < 0 (as occurs when P is relatively large and κ relatively small) does
not belong to the domain of the Pareto frontier, and can therefore be ruled out as a bargaining outcome.
On the interval of P for which u01 Pð Þ > 0 and Π
0
(P) > 0 (which occurs at relatively high levels of both P and κ) it is a
Pareto improvement for both parties to raise the price to the maximum price on the interval. The maximal P is therefore
the only candidate for the local bargaining outcome.
On the interval of P for which u01 Pð Þ<0 and Π
0
(P) > 0 the Nash product is strictly concave, and therefore attains a
maximum (albeit this may not be interior). As shown in Figure 2, this occurs when κ≤ κ1 and P≤ P̂ (and so b1 = 0). In
this region the bargaining solution differs according to the sign of κ. When κ≤ 0 an interior bargaining outcome exists







This condition obtains because in a Nash bargain where the agent that makes the transfer places a value of zP > 0 on
an additional unit of transfer, while the agent that receives the transfer places a value of zR < 0 on each unit received,
the solution results in the share zP/(zP − zR) of the surplus for the paying agent. In the present case there is no bribery
and hold-up occurs through the requirement of paying tax T. The investor values additional profit one-for-one, while B1
places a value −η(1 + θ) = − (1 − κ) on each unit of price.
When κ  (0, κ1) an interior bargaining outcome, if it exists, is the solution to the first order condition


















Pð Þ− 1−κð Þ<0: ð22Þ
FIGURE 2 Price incentives in (κ, P)-space. Regions are labeled in the format sign (u01): sign (Π
0
)
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Pð Þ is independent of both P and θ. The right-side of (20) is therefore con-
stant. To explain (20)–(22), note first that a unit increase in P has both a direct effect on the payoffs of the investor and
B1, and an indirect effect through the endogenous adjustment of b
*
2 Pð Þ. The first term on the right-side of (21) is the
direct effect on Π, and the second term shows the loss from the induced higher level of bribe paid to B2. Equation (22)
shows similar effects for B1, although here the weights in the utility function (6) apply: the increase in b
*
2 Pð Þ is weighted
by θ, while for the higher price the weight η(1+ θ) = 1− κ applies. The net impact of these factors is that P is adjusted
so that the investor receives the proportion of the surplus shown in (20).18
6 | THE BARGAINING SOLUTION
We are now in a position to state the “global” bargaining solution:
Proposition 1. The Nash bargaining solution if government provision would be almost efficient is as follows:
i. If κ  [κ2, 1], then
P=P1 =1; b1 = b
*
1 1ð Þ > 0; b2 = b*2 1ð Þ > 0:














b1 =0; b2 = b
*




are given by (21) and (22).





; b1 = b2 =0:
With sufficiently high corruptibility (as in part (i) of the proposition), both bureaucrats secure positive bribes. With
moderate corruptibility (as in part (ii)) only bureaucrat B2 secures a positive bribe; bureaucrat B1 is not bribed. With
nonpositive corruptibility, neither bureaucrat is bribed. We shall refer to the three types of solution as the “full-bribery,”
“partial-bribery,” and “no-bribery” cases, respectively.
The full-bribery case (i) results from high corruptibility κ  [κ2, 1], with the bargaining solution characterized by
hold-up, a maximal project price, and both B1 and B2 securing positive bribes. The interval κ  [κ2, 1] can be partitioned
into the subintervals κ  [κ2, κ1) and κ  [κ1, 1]. On the latter interval, Figure 2 shows that both B1 and the investor
always prefer a higher price, so the Nash product is monotone in P. On the former interval, Figure 2 shows that,
although both B1 and the investor prefer a higher price for P≥ P̂, their interests over P conflict for P< P̂. The proof of
Proposition 1 establishes that, nevertheless, the Nash product is monotone on P K +W , P̂
 
, and therefore globally
monotone. As such, although the constant κ1 is of importance in developing the intuitions behind the model, it plays
no role in the characterization of the bargaining outcome.
The partial-bribery case (ii) holds when there is moderate corruptibility κ  (0, κ2); the Nash product is strictly con-
cave and nonmonotone on P K +W , P̂
 
, such that the first-order condition in (20) admits an interior solution. This is
the unique bargaining outcome as neither B1 nor the investor wish to agree a price P > P̂. Accordingly, although
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corruptibility is positive, B1 nevertheless behaves honestly in the bargaining solution. Note that, unlike in the other two
cases, price in this case not constant: Pii is a function of {η, θ}.
The no-bribery case (iii) obtains when corruptibility is nonpositive. With neither B1 nor B2 taking a bribe, the
bargaining outcome is instead the solution to (19), at which B2 levies a tax on the investor. This is the same solution as
would be found if the bureaucrats eschewed bribery on principle.
An immediate implication of Proposition 1(ii) is the following:











It might have been expected that for transitions across the three cases in Proposition 1 P would be greatest with full
bribery, lower with partial bribery, and lowest with no bribery. Interestingly, however, the corollary confirms that it is
possible that the lowest price occurs with partial bribery. In particular, when (23) is negative at κ = 0 then P, having
fallen from 1 at high κ to below (1 + K + W)/2 at κ = 0, jumps discretely upward for κ below zero. This result is driven
by different impacts on the surplus S1 of varying P when there is a bribe and when there is taxation at t = 2. In the par-
tial bribery case, with b2 > 0 as part of the bargaining solution, a marginal increase in P causes bribe b2 to be larger,
which increases the leakage in the surplus available to B1 and the investor. This limits the incentive to set a relatively
high price. In contrast, in the no-bribery case tax is part of the bargaining solution, and, from (8) and (11), a higher P is
associated with a higher tax and larger surplus.
To understand the direction of the price jump for κ below zero the condition in Corollary 1 must be evaluated at this
point.





such that the direction of the price jump below κ = 0 (from Pii to (1 +K+W)/2) is
upward if and only if η> ηc.
The possibility that P is nonmonotone in κ has important implications for the relationship between P and care η for
domestic welfare. To analyze these implications it is necessary to understand at a detailed level the role of {η, θ} in the
bargaining solution.19 This cannot be inferred straightforwardly from Proposition 1 for, as we have noted, θ does not
only appear in κ; the critical level κ2 is also a function of θ. Moreover, for a given η, independent variation of θ can only
vary corruptibility on the interval κ  [1 − 2η, 1 − η] and, similarly, independent variation of η for a given θ can only
vary corruptibility on the interval κ  [0, 1 + θ]. Accordingly, some outcomes in Proposition 1 are infeasible for some
parameter ranges.
The first insight not immediate from Proposition 1 is the important role of α, the responsiveness of compensation,
in determining the shape of the set of {η, θ} for which κ  (0, κ2). We therefore split the results into two parts according
to the size of α.
Proposition 2A. When α≥ 1
3
the bargaining solution depends on care η for domestic welfare as follows:
i. If η = 1 then P= 1+K +W
2
.
ii. If η 1+ α
3−α ,1
 
then P = Pii if θ<
1−η
η
and P= 1+K +W
2
otherwise.





then there exists a unique θ̂ 0, 1−η
η
 
such that if θ≤ θ̂ then P = 1; if θ θ̂, 1−η
η
 
then P = Pii; and if
θ≥ 1−η
η
then P= 1+K +W
2
.
iv. If η< 1
2
then P = 1.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the κ = 0 and κ = κ2 loci. Above κ = 0, P = (1 + K + W)/2.
Between the two loci P = Pii, while below the κ = κ2 locus P = 1.
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In this proposition α is relatively large, the key feature being that when α ≥ 1/3 the κ = κ2 locus is downward-
sloping in θ, as seen in the figure. To understand the shape of the κ = κ2 locus, recall that κ⋛ κ2 , S01 Pð Þ⋛ 0, where,
using (1) and (6),
S01 Pð Þ= κ− 1−θð Þb*2
0
Pð Þ: ð24Þ
The first term in (24) is the marginal utility from a fall in domestic welfare, whereas the second term is the marginal




Pð Þ=∂α<0, implying that, for higher α, b*2 becomes less price-responsive
(thereby reducing the marginal leakage). The interaction ∂2b*2
0
Pð Þ=∂θ∂α is also negative, so the marginal leakage
becomes less sensitive to centralization with α. From (8) and (24), it is found that
∂S01 Pð Þ
∂η













Equation (25) confirms that, beginning at S01 =0, an increase in η turns S
0
1 negative. Equation (26) confirms that to
restore S01 =0 may require θ either to be increased or decreased. As the threshold θ in (26) is an increasing function of
α, for sufficiently high α, ∂S01 Pð Þ=∂θ<0. In this case, therefore, one must decrease θ to return to S01 =0, consistent with
Proposition 2A.
The second insight emerging from Proposition 2A is that, whereas in the analyses of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and
Waller et al. (2002) centralization necessarily shapes the equilibrium outcome actively, in our model the role of θ is impor-
tantly conditioned by the level of concern for domestic welfare, η. As seen in Figure 3, for η sufficiently low, θ plays no
role in shaping the bargaining solution. For η sufficiently high, θ plays an active but limited role, as it can only induce






, that centralization is highly
influential in the model. In particular, on this interval, it is seen that all three price outcomes in Proposition 1 are feasi-
ble for given η. Note also that the effect is asymmetric: extreme values of θ do not limit the role of η in the same way.
A final set of insights from Proposition 2A arise when considering the price transitions as {η, θ} are raised separately.
In light of Lemma 6, the nature of these price transitions is affected critically by the location of ηc. We focus on one of






. This case is depicted in
Figure 4, which covers the parameter ranges assumed in parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2A. The figure shows the loci
κ = 0, κ = κ2, and Pii = (1+K+W)/2 such that condition (23) in Corollary 1 is exactly zero. The critical value ηc is there-
fore indicated at the η for which the κ = 0 and Pii = (1+K+W)/2 loci intersect.
FIGURE 3 The bargaining outcome in (κ, η)-space when α ≥ 1/3
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. We see that price transitions are non-
monotone in centralization. Initially P = 1, before transitioning downwards to price P = Pii<1. But, when θ is such that
κ = 0 the price jumps discretely upward to P = (1+K+W)/2. This discrete jump arises as B2 switches discretely from
demanding a (surplus-leaking) bribe, to instead demanding a (surplus-enhancing) tax.
As well as the possibility of nonmonotone price transitions, it is apparent from studying Figure 4, when allowing θ
to vary for (i) different levels of η, and (ii) ηc to be either above or below η=
1+ α
3−α, that a range of outcomes are possible,
including the possibilities that price is independent of θ (for η sufficiently low), that price transitions are all upward, or
that price transitions are all downward. Thus, the interplay between {η, θ}, further mediated by α, is sufficient to drive a
potentially complex relationship between price (and therefore ultimately domestic welfare) and centralization.
Nonmonotone price transitions are also possible as η is varied independently. According to Figure 3, as η is raised, price
transitions (downwards) from 1 to Pii, and then from Pii to (1 + K + W)/2. If θ is to the left of the Pii = (1 + K + W)/2 locus
in Figure 4 the latter transition is upward (implying a nonmonotone pattern) and downwards otherwise.
In Proposition 2B, we assume that α is smaller than in 2A. This might reflect a greater sensitivity of compensation
to fixed costs or an element of fixed penalty in compensation.
Proposition 2B. When α< 1
3
(b2 more price-responsive) the bargaining solution depends on care η for domestic welfare as
follows:
i. If η = 1 then P= 1+K +W
2
.




then P = Pii if θ<
1−η
η
and P= 1+K +W
2
otherwise.





then there exists a unique θ̂ 0,1ð Þ such that if θ≤ θ̂ then P = Pii, and P = 1 otherwise.





iv. if η< 1+ α
3−α then P = 1.












then there exists 0< θ̂1 < θ̂2 <1 such that P = 1 if either θ≤ θ̂1 or θ≥ θ̂2, and P = Pii otherwise, where
η1 









vi. If η  [0, η1] then P = 1.
FIGURE 4 The bargaining outcome when η  (1/2, 1) and ηc  (1/2, (1 + α)/(3 − α)). Indicated are the regions for which price
transitions are increasing, decreasing, and nonmonotone in θ
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Figure 5a illustrates the proposition, with the exception of part (v), which we discuss separately. Compared to
Figure 3, the order of the critical values of η, 1/2, and (1 + α)/(3 − α), is reversed. Importantly, in parts (i)–(iv) α is suffi-
ciently low (α < 1/3) that the prior analysis of the slope of the κ = κ2 locus is turned on its head such that it becomes
upward-sloping. As a direct consequence, even for intermediate levels of η, only a single price transition is possible as θ
is varied on [0, 1]. With at most one price transition, therefore, at this very low level of α it is not possible to observe
nonmonotone patterns of price transition with respect to θ. There remain, nevertheless, two price transitions as η is var-
ied independently, and these may be nonmonotone (depending upon ηc).






is similar, but with one crucial difference, which is




. Figure 5b, which shows the main result, therefore focuses solely on
this interval of η. In this intermediate range α is too small for the κ = κ2 locus to be everywhere decreasing, and too
large for it to be everywhere increasing. Rather, as seen in the figure, the κ = κ2 locus is approximately U-shaped. Thus,
when drawing horizontal lines across Figure 5b, the κ = κ2 locus is intersected twice.
Consequently, price is nonmonotone in θ: the high price P = 1 pertains for extreme values of θ, but the lower price
Pii applies for intermediate θ. Although the nonmonotonicity explored in Proposition 2A also entails higher prices at
extreme levels of centralization, this pattern of nonmonotonicity is qualitatively different in that it involves a transition
between just two equilibria, rather than between three. From (26), when θ increases from a relatively low value this
causes S01 Pð Þ to fall, and may change from positive to negative. If so, from (18) we first have κ> κ2 and then κ< κ2 and,
from Proposition 1, P switches from 1 to Pii. However, again from (26), when θ increases from a relatively high value,
S01 Pð Þ increases, and the sign of S01 Pð Þ may switch from negative to positive, with a corresponding switch from κ< κ2
and P = Pii to κ> κ2 and P = 1. The set of parameter values assumed in Proposition 2B(v) is such that these changes in
the sign of S01 Pð Þ occur.
Since domestic welfare D = 1 − P, Propositions 2A and 2B (which relate to P) have immediate implications for
domestic welfare.
Corollary 2. Consider a decrease in care η or centralization θ (and thus in total care η(1 + θ)). (i) If this increases cor-
ruptibility from κ ≤ 0 to κ  (0, κ2) (a transition from a no-bribe to a partial-bribe equilibrium) the effect on domestic
welfare D may be of either sign. (ii) If it increases corruptibility from κ  (0, κ2) to κ  [κ2, 1] (a transition from a par-
tial-bribe to a full-bribe equilibrium) there is a negative effect on domestic welfare D. (iii) If κ ≤ 0 or κ  [κ2, 1] (either
a no-bribe or a full-bribe equilibrium obtains) then domestic welfare D is unaffected; but if κ  (0, κ2) (a partial-bribe
equilibrium still obtains) the effect on domestic welfare is unclear.
Consider two bureaucracies. In bureaucracy A bureaucrats have an intermediate level of care for domestic welfare,
whereas in bureaucracy B bureaucrats care deeply about domestic welfare. Intuition would dictate that, ceteris paribus,
(a) (b)











and η (η1, [1 +α]/[3− α])
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domestic welfare outcomes would be superior in bureaucracy B relative to bureaucracy A. While Corollary 2 rules-in
such intuition, it makes clear that welfare outcomes could nonetheless be better in bureaucracy A. The reason for this
is that a transition from a no-bribe to a partial-bribe equilibrium (which occurs at an intermediate level of care) can be
associated with a higher project price. This result, when combined with part (i), allows for price transitions to be non-
monotone in total care. In particular, the highest and lowest levels of care can be associated with lower welfare out-
comes than are attained at intermediate levels of care. We note in part (iii) of the corollary that, for changes in care that
move the bargaining outcome within the set of partial-bribe equilibria, tractability precludes a definite statement as to
the effect on welfare.
It is worth emphasizing that Corollary 2 embeds two distinct ways in which a similar nonmonotone pattern of wel-
fare transitions to changes in centralization can occur. The first way is via the analysis in Proposition 2A, whereas the
(seemingly counter-intuitive) nonmonotonicity in welfare can be traced directly to the seemingly counter-intuitive
ordering of the prices in Proposition 1, specifically that Pii < (1 + K + W)/2 when κ = 0. This ordering can, in turn, be
accounted for by the price-restraint imposed on the investor and B1 when raising price causes leakage of the surplus to
B2. By contrast, the second route to nonmonotonicity—that via the analysis of Proposition 2B—holds even when the
ordering of the prices in Proposition 1 is in the intuitive direction. It relies only on the way in which centralization
interacts with α in determining how the surplus responds to price. Accordingly, even when the ordering of the prices in
Proposition 1 is in the intuitive direction, the model still indicates the possibility of a nonmonotone relationship
between centralization and welfare.
7 | FURTHER DISCUSSION
A key qualitative implication of the analysis is that the relationship between centralization and domestic welfare
can take many shapes, consistent with the mixed evidence found empirically. Consider a researcher with data on
welfare and corruption (bribery) in countries with bureaucracies differing in centralization. According to
Propositions 2A and 2B, the relationships that will be estimated, both between centralization and corruption, and
between corruption and welfare will depend on the prevailing η and α. Our model predicts that, for each relation-
ship, the possible outcomes include the finding of no relationship, the finding of a positive relationship, or the
finding of a negative relationship. As a consequence, the overall relationship estimated between centralization
and welfare, with corruption as an intermediary, will also depend on both η and α. The possibility of non-
monotonicity between centralization and welfare arising from Proposition 2A (high α) derives from non-
monotonicity in the relationship between corruption and welfare. The possibility of nonmonotonicity between
centralization and welfare arising from Proposition 2B (intermediate α) instead derives from nonmonotonicity in
the relationship between centralization and corruption.
We now discuss informally some possible generalizations of our analysis. First we consider the effects of dropping
the assumption that the government is only marginally inefficient. We go on to discuss the potential effects of dropping
the assumption that the two bureaucrats have the same preferences, and we consider this possibility further by suppos-
ing that bureaucrat B1 has imperfect information regarding B2's preferences. Then we comment briefly on some changes
that might be made to how the investor's behavior is modeled.
If the government were to expropriate the project directly, the running costs would be (1 + γ)W, where the parame-
ter γ is a measure of its inefficiency. For simplicity, we have assumed that γ # 0, as this ensures that hold-up always
takes place. If, however, a larger value of γ is allowed, the Nash bargaining product for bureaucrat B1 and the investor
has a finite discontinuity at P=P. When κ>0, as P is raised through P= PH there is a downward step in the Nash
bargaining product, and the step is larger when γ is greater.
We have seen that on P K +W ,P½  the Nash bargaining product is maximized at P= P, which is the highest price
at which hold-up will not occur. If we only consider the interval P P,1ð  then, with minor modifications due to the
presence of the term γW in b*2 and T
*, the analysis in the sections above holds. However, without restriction of P to this
interval, for κ>0 the Nash bargaining product for any potential solution in this interval must be compared with the
Nash bargaining product for P = PH. Because of the finite step down at P = PH it cannot be discounted a priori that for
some parameter values P = PH will be the global solution. Including this factor in the exposition would complicate it
considerably, adding little insight.20 Nonetheless, if the government would be greatly inefficient at running the project,
so that direct expropriation would not be a credible threat, the outcome would be that P takes a lower value, and
domestic welfare a greater value, than in the solutions we have analyzed in this paper.
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Consider now the effects of extending the analysis so that care for domestic welfare is heterogeneous across the two
bureaucrats, such that Bi, i  {1, 2}, has care ηi. A full exposition of this case is beyond the scope of the paper, but some
indicative points may be made. The analogues of (25) and (26) in this case are given by ∂S1=∂b2jκ2 > 0 = − 1−θð Þ≤ 0 and
∂S1=∂Tjκ2 ≤ 0 = −κ1≥ 0, where κi = 1− ηi(1 + θ). Thus, the differential effects of b2 and T on the first-stage surplus
(which drive the nonmonotonicity result in Proposition 2A) are still present, but it is only the care of B1 that plays a role
in the effect of T. The marginal surplus, which governs the shape of the κ = κ2 locus, is now given by
S01 = κ1− 1−θð Þb*2
0
P;κ2ð Þ. Accordingly, the way in which η1 affects the marginal surplus is independent of η2
(∂2S01 Pð Þ=∂η1∂η2 =0). By contrast, the effect on S01 from θ is mediated (positively) by η2 (∂2S01 Pð Þ=∂θ∂η2 = θ 1−αð Þ > 0).
Noting that ∂2b*2
0
Pð Þ=∂θ∂α<0, increases in η2 play a role similar to decreases in α. Nonmonotone price transitions even-
tually disappear for sufficiently low α (Proposition 2B). Accordingly, relative to our analysis with η1 = η2, for given η1
the scope for nonmonotone price transitions appears to be greater when η2< η1, and smaller when η2> η1.
Heterogeneity in the ηi could also be subject to imperfect information. In particular, B1 may bargain at t = 1 not
knowing for sure whether B2 will take a (surplus-leaking) bribe or demand a (surplus-enhancing) tax at time t = 2. In
this case B1's uncertainty gradually attenuates the sharp differentiation in the effects of {b2, T} on the surplus around
κ1 = 0. This makes it less likely, in an a priori sense, that the nonmonotonicity result in Proposition 2A would obtain. It
is unclear that this consideration affects importantly the source of nonmonotonicity in Proposition 2B, however.
Other amendments of the model, such as assuming that alternative investors compete for the contract, or making
investment an endogenous variable, would require more extensive revisions. However, in the absence of further compli-
cations, in each of these cases, after the investment has been sunk, the second period of the model would be the same
as in the current formulation. Consequently, we would expect the rationale for bureaucrat B1 and the investor to col-
lude against the interests of bureaucrat B2 by holding back price would remain. This factor drives some of our more
interesting welfare results, so we expect that, qualitatively, these results would still hold.
8 | CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed bribery and bureaucratic structure in the context of an infrastructure investment by a
foreign firm, focusing on equilibria in which the threat of hold-up is insufficient to prevent the investment from occur-
ring. In our model there are two bureaucrats. The first agrees the price for the project with the investor, and the second
may then hold up the investor. We characterize our results in terms of bureaucratic corruptibility, which depends on
both the care bureaucrats have for domestic welfare and the degree of centralization (i.e., how far the bureaucrats col-
lude with one another).
Intuitively, we might expect less bureaucratic care to be associated with lower domestic welfare. However, we spec-
ify ranges of parameter values for which the opposite result holds. The main underlying complication that causes this
result is that bureaucrat B1 and the investor in effect can collude against the interest of bureaucrat B2 in order to maxi-
mize their own bargaining surplus. The impact of less bureaucratic care (greater corruptibility) can be that B2 chooses
to take a bribe. But then B1 and the investor may prefer to limit the level of the price in order to restrict B2's leverage for
hold-up, thereby restricting the leakage from their surplus in the form of the bribe to B2; and the lower price translates
into greater domestic welfare.
Thus, our analysis reveals a mechanism through which the existence of bribery may be associated with greater
domestic welfare. This mechanism is distinct from the grease hypothesis, and may be one of the factors underlying the
results of empirical studies that in some cases have detected beneficial effects of corruption in heavily regulated
economies.
More generally, we identify parameter ranges on which the relationship of corruptibility with domestic welfare is
increasing, on which it is decreasing and on which it is nonmonotone. These results apply for variation in both bureau-
cratic care and the degree of centralization. The literature on centralization is contradictory, some studies showing a
positive, and others a negative, relationship, depending on context. Our analysis emphasizes how the impact of (de)cen-
tralization depends on the values of the bureaucrats concerned. The results are straightforward for extreme (high or
low) levels of bureaucratic care. But, otherwise, the precise level of care affects whether an increase in the degree of
centralization results in greater or smaller domestic welfare. The details of these relationships also depend on the spe-
cifics of the outside option for B2, that is, on the terms on which the threat of direct expropriation are made.
We have discussed briefly the potential effects of dropping some of our simplifying assumptions. Some other compli-
cations that we conjecture would not affect the general thrust of our results include the generalization to nonlinear
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utility functions, and introducing uncertainty with symmetric information, for example over costs and the value of the
project output. We would still expect that, for some parameter ranges, bureaucrat B1 and the investor would in effect
collude against the interests of B2; that complex relationships would hold between bureaucratic care and the degree of
centralization on the one hand, and the incidence of bribery and level of welfare on the other; and that the effects of
the degree of centralization would be mediated through the degree of bureaucratic care. A more fundamental change,
that would require an extensive reformulation, would be to assume asymmetric information with regard to the inves-
tor's costs and the value of the project output.
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ENDNOTES
1 The World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure Database contains information on more than 6400 projects dating from 1984.
World Bank (2018) lists $43.5bn of current investment commitments.
2 Specific cases of bribery in infrastructure provision are reported widely in the media. For example, according to The Economist, November
17, 2018, Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction firm, was charged with bribing officials in a dozen Latin American countries, including with
regard to a $1.6bn contract to build a motorway in Colombia; while Reuters, August 7, 2020 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
malaysia-politics-idUSKCN25307M) records that Malaysia is charging a former Finance Minister with seeking a bribe in connection with
a $1.5bn infrastructure project.
3 A more disaggregated approach to bribery is taken by Hakkala et al. (2008), who examine the relationship of FDI with measures of corrup-
tion in the receiving country. They find (i) that firms which invest in a country to sell there are affected negatively by corruption, and
(ii) no effect of corruption on firms that invest in a country to export from it. They do not consider firms undertaking infrastructure invest-
ment, however.
4 We consider the difference between the grease hypothesis and our analysis in Section 2.
5 Our analysis builds on the framework developed by Bennett and Estrin (2006).
6 Although not as widespread as investor-led renegotiation (which typically exploits private information), government-led renegotiation is
nonetheless common. For example, Guasch et al. (2008) analyze 307 government-led renegotiations in Latin America. They note that in
many cases government behavior is opportunistic, aiming to expropriate quasi-rents and sunk investments.
7 The first bureaucrat may, for example, belong to a government department with an international orientation and have been involved in
securing the investment. The second might have a more domestic focus with fiscal responsibilities, or might operate at a regional level.
8 Hajzler and Rosborough (2016) note that over the period 1990–2014 there were 162 direct expropriations across 44 countries. This suggests
that direct expropriation can be a credible threat.
9 We consider the implications of greater government inefficiency near the end of the paper.
10 For a detailed overview of the literature on corruption, see Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016).
11 Note, however, that Carrasco (2010) obtains the opposite result in a different theoretical framework. In his model the agent has
private information about effort and the impact of effort is uncertain. He finds that separation of two principals is more efficient than
integration.
12 We do not include bribe income in D. This may be interpreted as a value judgment, or it may be assumed to reflect the likelihood that
bureaucrats will save and spend bribe income abroad, yielding little domestic benefit. It may also indicate that bureaucrats have expended
resources in rent-seeking, up to the value of any bribes paid.
13 Both bureaucrats are “corrupt” in the sense that they do not reject bribery on principle. Their corruptibility relates to the specific circum-
stances they each face in the model.
14 We exclude the possibility that α = 1 because the threat of direct expropriation would not then be credible. We also exclude α = 0 because
the model would then in effect reduce to one period (t = 2) for which the price agreed at t = 1 would be irrelevant.
15 If (dropping Assumption 2) we had PH = C(PH) + (1 + γ)W ≤ K + W, then any agreed level of P1 would exceed P
H, so that hold-up would
necessarily occur. The restriction that PH = C(PH) + (1 + γ)W > K + W ensures that whether hold-up is a solution to the model is deter-
mined endogenously, through the deal struck by B1 and the investor. If (dropping Assumption 3) we had P
H ≥ (1 + K + W)/2, then, either
instead of or in addition to a solution with hold-up, a solution without hold-up (where P1 = P = (1 + K + W)/2) would obtain.
20 BENNETT AND RABLEN
16 As Hermalin and Katz (2009) note for a related bargaining problem with full information, one side might make a take-it-or-leave-it offer,
demanding the entire surplus for itself. In our model a take-it-or-leave-it offer might be made by either side. We follow Hart (1995), who,
in this situation, assumes that neither side has more bargaining power than the other, so that a standard Nash bargain will obtain.
17 There is no case in which u01 Pð Þ > 0 but Π
0
(P) < 0.
18 We noted above in connection with κ2 how θ plays an independent role in the analysis, apart from as a constituent of κ. This independent
role can also be seen in (22).
19 Variation of {η, θ} also affects the value of Pii, but the relationship is intractable.
20 The potential for nonmonotone effects remains in this version of the model. Indeed, when, for intermediate centralization, the price PH
(which always lies below Pii) obtains as part of a bargaining outcome this accentuates any upward price jump for κ below zero.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. Let P1 = K + W. Then under Assumption 2 we have C(K + W) < K − γW and so K + W > C(K
+ W) + (1 + γ)W. Therefore, expropriation is not a credible threat if P1 = K + W. Under Assumption 3, (1 + K
+ W)/2 > C([1 + K + W]/2) + (1 + γ)W, so that expropriation is a credible threat if P1 = (1 + K + W)/2. By
Assumption 1, C(P1) is differentiable on P1  (K + W, (1 + K + W)/2) and therefore also continuous on this inter-
val. Hence, by continuity, there exists a PH  (K + W, [1 + K + W]/2) such that PH = C(PH) + (1 + γ)W.
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting from (6), provision by the investor gives B2 utility u2 = θb1 + b2 + (1 − κ)(1 − P1 + T).
The disagreement payoff to B2 under direct expropriation is θb1 + η(1 + θ)[1 − C(P1) − (1 + γ)W]. Add and sub-
tract C(PH) + α(P1 − P
H) to rewrite the disagreement payoff as










− 1+ γð ÞW
 
:
Note, first, that the final term, −C(PH) − (1 + γ)W, is identically −PH. Second, note that, given Assumption 1, the term
[C(P1) − C(P
H) − α(P1 − P
H)] is independent of P1. As this term is zero for P1 = P
H it is zero for all P1. The disagreement
payoff for B2 therefore reduces to θb1 + (1 − κ)(1 − α(P1 − P
H) − PH). The surplus for B2 is therefore b2 + (1 − κ)[T
− (1 − α)(P1 − P
H)]. Using (1), provision by the investor gives a profit Π = P1 − T − K − W − b1 − b2, while with direct
expropriation Π = C(P1) − K − b1. Using the same substitutions as above this rewrites as Π = α(P1 − P
H) + PH − K
− b1 − (1 + γ)W. The surplus for the investor is therefore S
I
2 T,b2ð Þ= 1−αð Þ P1−PH
 
−W −T−b2 + 1+ γð ÞW . The sum
of the surpluses is therefore S2(T) = − κ[T− (1− α)(P1−P
H)] + γW.
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To see that b2 > 0 note that b2 = b
*









1−κð Þ > 0.
This same derivative holds also in the limit as P #PH when κ≤ 0. It remains to consider the limit case P #PH when




















= 1−αð Þ 2−κð Þ=2. This Nash prod-









# 1, which occurs for κ # 0 and α # 0. Thus, if the Nash product












# 1 the Nash prod-
uct reduces to (PH−K−W)(1− θ)≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Suppose κ ≤ 0. Then b*1 Pð Þ≷ 0,P≷ 1− 1−K−W2−κ
 
= P̂ K +W ,1ð Þ. (ii) Now suppose κ>0. Note
that b*1 K +Wð Þ<0. Then
b*1 1ð Þ≷ 0, b*2 1ð Þ≶1−K−W , κ≷ 2−
2 1−K−Wð Þ− 1+ θð ÞγW
1−αð Þ 1+ θð Þ 1−PH
  = κc:
The condition in the lemma implies κc < 0. Hence, κ > κc and so b
*
1 1ð Þ > 0. Then, by continuity, there exists a unique
P̂ K +W ,1ð Þ such that b*1 P̂
 
=0.
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) If κ > 0 then u01 Pð Þ≷ 0, θb*2
0
Pð Þ≷ 1−κ. As b*2
0
Pð Þ= 1−αð Þ 2−κð Þ=2 it follows that





If κ ≤ 0 then u01 Pð Þ= − 1−κð Þ<0. So u01 Pð Þ<0 for all κ< κ1. (ii) If κ>0 and P > P̂ then the surplus is split equally
between B1 and the investor. Both parties then prefer price to be increased or decreased according to whether





Pð Þ= 1−αð Þ 2−κð Þ=2 it follows that
u01 Pð Þ≷ 0,Π0 Pð Þ≷ 0, κ≷ 2 1−
2
2+ 1−θð Þ 1−αð Þ
 
:
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Per Figure 2, for κ > κ1 both B1 and the investor prefer a higher price, so P is maximal. We
now show that the Nash product is also increasing everywhere for κ > κ1  [κ2, κ1]. For P > P̂ both B1 and the
investor again prefer a higher price, so it remains to consider the interval P≤ P̂. The Nash product is
























≥ 0, which completes the proof. (ii) We use a Taylor series expansion of u1(P)Π(P) around P = (1
+K+W)/2. For brevity, we write u1 = u1([1+K+W]/2), Π = Π([1+K+W]/2) we have
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From the proof of part (i), Pii < P̂. To see that Pii>K+W, note that this holds if Π
0u1 K +Wð Þ+ u01Π K +Wð Þ > 0. This
condition holds as u01 <0 and Π(K+W) < 0. (iii) The bargaining solution given in the proposition is the solution to the
first-order condition in (19).
Proof of Lemma 6. We write Pii ≡ Pii(κ). Then, solving Pii(0) = (1 + K + W)/2 for η, and determining the appropriate





+ 2−αð Þ PH−K−W
  :
To see ηc < 1 note that ηc " 1 as PH # K + W. To see ηc > 1/2 note that ηc # 1/2 as α # 0.
Proof of Propositions 2A and 2B. If η = 1 then κ = − θ ≤ 0. To prove the remaining parts, we have κ ≥ κ2 , f(α, θ, η) ≡
4 − [2 + (1 − α)(1 − θ)][1 + η(1 + θ)] ≥ 0. f(α, θ, η) attains a global minimum at θ= 1−αð Þ−1− 2ηð Þ−1  _θ. Solv-
ing f α, _θ,η
 
=0 gives the condition for η1 in Proposition 2B. Whether κ≥ κ2 at the boundary values of θ is there-
fore determined by the inequalities
f α,0,ηð Þ≷ 0, η≶1+ α
3−α
;
f α,1,ηð Þ≷ 0, η≶1
2
:









The minimum of the κ = κ2 loci (at θ= _θ) is relevant only when _θ 0,1½ :
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